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- handle: 10670/1.ck6ydp
- halshs: halshs-01380198
- doi: 10.1111/ecoj.12215
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/ecoj.12215
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Political EntrenchmentSujets proches
Examples Exemplars Polls Papers Fortunes Household income Personal income Family income Funds Funding Pattern Model Social inequality Social equality Inequality Egalitarianism Child placing Finance, commerce, confiscations, etcCiter ce document
Gilles Saint-Paul et al., « A Theory of Political Entrenchment », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1111/ecoj.12215
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Résumé
Can an incumbent political party increase its chances at re-election by implementing inefficient policies that harm its constituency? This paper studies the possibility of such a phenomenon, which we label political entrenchment. We use a two-party dynamic model of redistribution with probabilistic voting. Political entrenchment by the Left occurs only if incumbency rents are sufficiently high. Low-skill citizens may vote for this party even though they rationally expect the adoption of these policies. We discuss: the possibility of entrenchment by the Right; the scope for commitment to avoid entrenchment policies; and the effect of state capacity, income inequality and party popularity on the likelihood of entrenchment. We illustrate our theory with a number of historical examples.