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- handle: 10670/1.ckhtpw
- halshs: halshs-00733401
- doi: 10.1007/s10888-011-9207-y
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s10888-011-9207-y
Mots-clés
Income sources Shapley value Inequality Decomposition rule D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D62 - Externalities C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C71 - Cooperative GamesSujets proches
Standard of value Social inequality Social equality Inequality EgalitarianismCiter ce document
Frédéric Chantreuil et al., « Inequality decomposition values: the trade-off between marginality and efficiency », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s10888-011-9207-y
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Résumé
This paper presents a general procedure for decomposing income inequality measures by income sources. The methods of decomposition proposed are based on the Shapley value and extensions of the Shapley value of transferable utility cooperative games. In particular, we find that Owen's value can find an interesting application in this context.We show that the axiomatization by the potential of Hart and Mas-Colell remains valid in the presence of the domain restriction of inequality indices. We also examine the properties of these decomposition rules and perform a comparison with Shorrocks' decomposition rule properties.