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1 janvier 1999
- handle: 10670/1.cq1lkj
- hal: hal-03193664
- doi: 10.1023/A:1018982313949
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1023/A:1018982313949
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reversed Stackelberg game cheating strategySujets proches
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Thomas Vallée et al., « Optimal open loop cheating in dynamic reversed Linear Quadratic Stackelberg games », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1023/A:1018982313949
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The distinctive characteristic of a “Reversed Stackelberg Game” is that the leader playstwice, first by announcing his future action, second by implementing a possibly different action given the follower’s reaction to his announcement. In such a game, if the leader uses the normal Stackelberg solution to find (and announce) his optimal strategy, there is a strong temptation for him to cheat, that is, to implement another action than the one announced. In this paper, within the framework of a standard discrete time Linear–Quadratic Dynamic Reversed Stackelberg game, we discuss and derive the best possible open-loop cheating strategy for an unscrupulous leader.