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4 janvier 2024
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.d18220...
- hal: hal-04739942
- doi: 10.1080/00343404.2023.2282139
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1080/00343404.2023.2282139
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
intermunicipal cooperation decentralisation theorem economies of scale zoo effect threshold regression model H - Public Economics/H.H1 - Structure and Scope of Government H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H73 - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H77 - Intergovernmental Relations • Federalism • Secession R - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics/R.R5 - Regional Government AnalysisCiter ce document
Quentin Frère et al., « Does decentralisation theorem shape intermunicipal cooperation? », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1080/00343404.2023.2282139
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Résumé
This paper proposes a theoretical model of voluntary intermunicipal cooperation and empirically tests its assertions through the French municipalities’ choices of transferring their competences to the intermunicipal level. Using an original threshold models inference procedure, a probit model is estimated on shared competences. Two main results arise. Contrary to the decentralisation theorem prediction, citizens’ preference heterogeneity does not hinder local cooperation, but fiscal potential heterogeneity does. Moreover, a zoo effect is at stake for some competences, for which a significant threshold effect in their transfer probability is identified.
