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2019
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.d182aa...
- hal: hal-04056262
- doi: 10.1353/pew.2019.0003
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1353/pew.2019.0003
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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Uriah Kriegel, « Dignāga's Argument for the Awareness Principle: An Analytic Refinement », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1353/pew.2019.0003
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According to the "awareness principle," a mental state is conscious only if the subject of that state is aware of it. This article develops and defends an argument for the awareness principle. The basic idea, presented originally by the sixth-century Indian philosopher Dignāga, is based on two fundamental ideas: (1) all conscious states are such that their subject can remember their occurrence at least at some later time, and (2) one can remember an event only if one was aware of it at the time of its occurrence. It follows that all conscious states are such that their subject is aware of them at the time of their occurrence.
