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- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.d4caa8...
- hal: hal-04056426
- doi: 10.1007/s13164-016-0304-5
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Anna Giustina et al., « Fact-Introspection, Thing-Introspection, and Inner Awareness », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1007/s13164-016-0304-5
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Phenomenal beliefs are beliefs about the phenomenal properties of one's concurrent conscious states. It is an article of common sense that such beliefs tend to be justified. Philosophers have been less convinced. It is sometimes claimed that phenomenal beliefs are not on the whole justified, on the grounds that they are typically based on introspection and introspection is often unreliable. Here we argue that such reasoning must guard against a potential conflation between two distinct introspective phenomena, which we call fact-introspection and thing -introspection; arguments for the unreliability of introspection typically target only the former, leaving the reliability of the latter untouched. In addition, we propose a theoretical framework for understanding thing -introspection that may have a surprising consequence: thing -introspection is not only reliable, but outright infallible. This points at a potential line of defense of phenomenal-belief justification, which here we only sketch very roughly.
