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- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.d5a139...
- halshs: halshs-00796487
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Strategic Complementarity Nested Split Graphs Linear Interaction Bonacich Centralities NetworkSujets proches
Plots (Diagrams) Graphs Diagrams, charts, etc Graphics GraphsCiter ce document
Mohamed Belhaj et al., « Network Design under Local Complementarities », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10670/1.d5a139...
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Résumé
We consider agents playing a linear network game with strategic complementarities. We analyse the problem of a policy maker who can change the structure of the network in order to increase the aggregate efforts of the individuals and/or the sum of their utilities, given that the number of links of the network has to remain fixed. We identify some link reallocations that guarantee an improvement of aggregate efforts and/or aggregate utilities. With this comparative statics exercise, we then prove that the networks maximising both aggregate outcomes (efforts and utilities) belong to the class of Nested-Split Graphs.
