Price Discrimination and Customer Behaviour: Empirical Evidence from Marseille

Fiche du document

Date

22 décembre 2008

Type de document
Périmètre
Langue
Identifiants
Collection

Archives ouvertes

Licence

info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess




Citer ce document

Alan Kirman et al., « Price Discrimination and Customer Behaviour: Empirical Evidence from Marseille », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10670/1.d72d6a...


Métriques


Partage / Export

Résumé 0

We analyse the interaction between a seller and customers in a shop on the fruits and vegetables wholesale market in Marseille using an unique data set. We find that customers' bargaining activity is correlated with the kind and location of the business. To determine how the interactions between the seller and the customers influence prices, we compare the price each customer pays for a given good with the daily average price. We find that a customer of the shop is more likely to pay a price higher than other customers for the same good if---ceteris paribus---the customer is unknown to the shop assistants, buys only a small quantity, or buys goods sold on commission. If the customer is known to the shop assistants, then loyalty and bargaining make it more likely that the customer gets better than average price.

document thumbnail

Par les mêmes auteurs

Sur les mêmes sujets

Sur les mêmes disciplines