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1 juillet 2018
- handle: 10670/1.d8ggm6
Ce document est lié à :
10.17151/difil.2018.19.33.2
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Mots-clés
Direct realism perceptual constancies philosophy of perception Anthony David Smith metaphysical and epistemic assumptions realism anti-realismSujets proches
Supraliminal perceptionCiter ce document
Pamela Ann J. Boongaling, « On the Perils of A.D. Smith’s Direct Realism », Discusiones Filosóficas, ID : 10670/1.d8ggm6
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Résumé
A rebuttal of the version of A.D. Smith’s version of direct realism according to which one can directly perceive the purely physical objects in the external world (Smith, 2002) is presented in this article. It is argued that, even if Smith can incorporate a characterization of veridical perception that takes into account the phenomenological character of our perceptual experiences, his theory of perception remains incoherent for it is unable to provide a solution to the inconsistency of the metaphysical and epistemic theses of his theory. For this reason, his version of direct realism is untenable.