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- handle: 10670/1.daeccw
- hal: hal-02289101
Mots-clés
Transfer of value Leverage Creditor’s holdup Target firms Acquisitions M - Business Administration and Business Economics • Marketing • Accounting • Personnel Economics/M.M1 - Business Administration/M.M1.M10 - General G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G34 - Mergers • Acquisitions • Restructuring • Corporate GovernanceSujets proches
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Luminita Enache et al., « Why do surviving targets leverage so much after an acquisistion: A governance explanation », HAL-SHS : droit et gestion, ID : 10670/1.daeccw
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Résumé
Surviving public firms after an acquisition will show important changes as the new controller generally undertakes investment and reorganization decisions to create additional value and seize synergies. An important issue is to balance a creditor’s holdup mechanism with the possibility for the creditors to capture a part of the synergy gains at the target’s level. We demonstrate empirically that an increase in leverage is developed to limit a transfer of value to creditors. The changes in financing structure are implemented shortly after the acquisition.