Enhancing spatial coordination in payment for ecosystem services schemes with non-pecuniary preferences
Fiche du document
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.de0882...
- hal: hal-03435954
- doi: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107271
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107271
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Agglomeration Bonus Coordination Games Environmental Preferences Laboratory Experiments Social Comparison Nudge spatial Coordination C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture/Q.Q1.Q15 - Land Ownership and Tenure • Land Reform • Land Use • Irrigation • Agriculture and Environment Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture/Q.Q1.Q18 - Agricultural Policy • Food Policy Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q57 - Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services • Biodiversity Conservation • Bioeconomics • Industrial EcologySujets proches
Land Land utilization Utilization of land Use of landCiter ce document
Laure Kuhfuss et al., « Enhancing spatial coordination in payment for ecosystem services schemes with non-pecuniary preferences », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2021.107271
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
he environmental benefits from Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes can often be enhanced if private land managers are induced to enrol land in a spatially coordinated manner. One incentive mechanism which has been proposed to achieve such spatial coordination is the agglomeration bonus, a two-part payment scheme which offers a pecuniary (financial) reward for decisions that lead to greater spatial coordination of enrolled land. However, farmers respond to a range of motives when deciding whether to participate in such schemes, including non-pecuniary motives such as a concern for the environment or social comparisons. This study implements a de-contextualised laboratory experiment to test the effectiveness of the agglomeration bonus when non-pecuniary motives are explicitly incorporated into the decision-making environment. We capture intrinsic preferences for the public good dimension of environmental improvement through a real donation to environmental charities and examine the relative impact of a group-ranking nudge. The experimental results show that the agglomeration bonus does indeed improve participation and spatial coordination when non-pecuniary motives are accounted for, but that its performance is not enhanced by the nudge.
