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- handle: 10670/1.de40tf
- hal: hal-03893206
- doi: 10.1111/iere.12474
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Mots-clés
Matching Taxation C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C78 - Bargaining Theory • Matching Theory D - Microeconomics/D.D3 - Distribution H - Public Economics/H.H2 - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue J - Labor and Demographic Economics/J.J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor CostsSujets proches
Duties Fee system (Taxation) Taxation, Incidence of Tax reform Tax policy TaxesCiter ce document
Arnaud Dupuy et al., « Taxation in Matching Markets », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1111/iere.12474
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Résumé
We analyze the effects of taxation in two-sided matching markets where agents have heterogeneous preferences over potential partners. Our model provides a continuous link between models of matching with and without transfers. Taxes generate inefficiency on the allocative margin, by changing who matches with whom. This allocative inefficiency can be nonmonotonic, but is weakly increasing in the tax rate under linear taxation if each worker has negative nonpecuniary utility of working. We adapt existing econometric methods for markets without taxes to our setting, and estimate preferences in the college-coach football market. We show through simulations that standard methods inaccurately measure deadweight loss.