Collective liability in non-point source pollution Responsabilité collective de la pollution diffuse
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29 novembre 2006
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.dfad9b...
- hal: hal-02818922
- PRODINRA: 13467
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
NEGOTIATION ADVERSE SELECTION MORAL HAZARD REVELATION MECHANISMS COLLECTIVE PERFORMANCE NON POINT SOURCE POLLUTION TRADABLE PERMITSSujets proches
Environmental pollution Chemical pollution Pollution--Control Contamination of environment Contaminación ambiental Medio ambiente--Contaminación Polución Dommages à l'environnement Pollution de l'environnement Contamination de l'environnement Pollution industrielle Dégradation de l'environnement Pollution chimique Atteintes à l'environnementCiter ce document
Mourad Ali et al., « Responsabilité collective de la pollution diffuse », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10670/1.dfad9b...
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Résumé
Non point source pollution is characterized by the fact that individual emissions are not observable at a reasonable cost. This constitutes a moral hazard problem. Furthermore, we explicitly consider adverse selection, a second type of asymmetric information that arises because of the difficulty to differentiate the polluters with respect to their type (marginal benefit of polluting). In this paper, we design a tradable permits market between non point sources of pollution. In order to involve all the polluters contributing to a measured ambient pollution, we consider a collective performance based mechanism. This sanction mechanism is activated if the collective fails to build itself. The threat remains active along a negotiation process in order to make it converge to the equilibrium solution. Indeed, the agents are induced to reveal their real type (polluter, non polluter) through a negotiation on their initial allocation of permits.
