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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.002
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Fatma Aslan et al., « Competitive equilibria in Shapley-Scarf markets with couples », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jmateco.2020.05.002
We investigate the existence and properties of competitive equilibrium in Shapley-Scarf markets involving an exogenous partition of individuals into couples. The presence of couples generates preference interdependencies which cause existence problems. For both cases of transferable and non-transferable income among partners, we establish properties for preferences that are sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium. Moreover, we show that these properties define a maximal preference domain.