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7 mars 2025
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.e6d497...
- hal: hal-04982101
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Vouchers Pull mechanisms Burden sharing Administered drug prices Prizes I - Health, Education, and Welfare/I.I1 - Health/I.I1.I18 - Government Policy • Regulation • Public Health L - Industrial Organization/L.L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property RightsSujets proches
Technological change Breakthroughs, Technological Innovations, Industrial Technological breakthroughs Technical innovations Innovations, Technological Prizes Prize moneyCiter ce document
Pierre Dubois et al., « The economics of transferable patent extensions », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10670/1.e6d497...
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Résumé
Faced with a scarcity of treatments for neglected diseases, experts and governmental organizations have lately proposed to build strong pull incentives around transferable vouchers. Inventors would be granted, and allowed to sell these vouchers to pharmas desiring to extend their exclusive IP rights. However, we know little about how such “Transferable Exclusivity Extensions” fare relative to prizes, who is likely to acquire them and at what cost for society, or how the burden is shared among nations. We shed light on these questions, both from a theoretical perspective and from an empirical analysis of European data.
