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- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.e7ddef...
- hal: hal-04682703
- doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106702
- WOS: 001318863900001
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106702
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Stage Dramatics Histrionics Theatre Professional theater Social science Sciences, Social Human sciences Social studies Behavioral sciences Case Funds Funding Resultants Stage Drama, Modern Plays Drama--Philosophy Collaborative law Alternative dispute resolution Dispute settlement ADR (Dispute resolution) Conflict resolution Dispute processing Managing conflict Conflict control Dispute settlement Conflict resolution Management of conflict Stage Histrionics Finance, commerce, confiscations, etc divertissement jeuxCiter ce document
Gabriel Bayle et al., « Solving conflict over common pool resources through delegation to a stakeholder », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106702
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Résumé
We study the effectiveness of delegation as a conflict resolution mechanism for managing common pool resources (CPR). Delegation involves empowering stakeholders to make collective decisions on behalf of resource users. We investigate, theoretically and experimentally, a delegation approval mechanism (DAM) in a three-player common-pool resource (CPR) game in which players can vote for extractions. In case of disapproval, in stage 2, one player is randomly selected to choose authoritatively the uniform extraction for the group, putting the disapproval arbitration at an endogenous level. Backwards elimination of weakly dominated strategies (BEWDS) predicts the socially optimum extraction under unanimity, but not under majority. Our experimental findings show that the DAM strongly reduces extractions and that most selected delegates choose the optimal extraction.
