Point-to-Point Strategic Communication

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Date

11 avril 2021

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Périmètre
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info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess




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Mael Le Treust et al., « Point-to-Point Strategic Communication », HAL-SHS : sciences de l'information, de la communication et des bibliothèques, ID : 10670/1.e7g0lh


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We propose a strategic formulation for the joint source-channel coding problem in which the encoder and the decoder are endowed with distinct distortion functions. We provide the solutions in four different scenarios. First, we assume that the encoder and the decoder cooperate in order to achieve a certain pair of distortion values. Second, we suppose that the encoder commits to a strategy whereas the decoder implements a best response, as in the persuasion game where the encoder is the Stackelberg leader. Third, we consider that the decoder commits to a strategy, as in the mismatched rate-distortion problem or as in the mechanism design framework. Fourth, we investigate the cheap talk game in which the encoding and the decoding strategies form a Nash equilibrium.

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