Voluntary management of fisheries under the threat of uncertain legislation

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10 janvier 2025

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Hubert Stahn, « Voluntary management of fisheries under the threat of uncertain legislation », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10670/1.ebc270...


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In this paper, we examine the possibility for a regulator to reduce policy costs by substituting a voluntary policy based on a legislative threat to an active harvest control. Specifically, we focus on fisheries where the regulator aims to maintain an optimal level of conservation through a voluntary agreement. To achieve this, we identify a mandatory regulation that can serve as a threat to ensure voluntary compliance and avoid regulation costs. However, threats differ from effective policies. To be enforceable, they must be validated through a legislative process, the outcome of which is uncertain and subject to objections. Consequently, we introduce of a random delay in its application and address issues of social acceptability. This threat rests upon two pillars: a moratorium with financial compensation followed by an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) mechanism, and a suitably chosen tax on harvesting capacity to deter deviations. We use data from the scallop fishery in the Bay of Saint-Brieuc (France) to illustrate this voluntary mechanism.

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