2019
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1515/9783110657920-009
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Uriah Kriegel, « The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1515/9783110657920-009
Traditional accounts of the perception/cognition divide tend to draw it in terms of subpersonal psychological processes, processes into which the subject has no first-person insight. Whatever betides such accounts, there seems to also be some first-personally accessible difference between perception and thought. At least in normal circumstances, naïve subjects can typically tell apart their perceptual states from their cognitive or intellectual ones. What are such subjects picking up on when they do so? This paper is an inconclusive search for an answer. At its end, I conclude, without joy, that we may have to simply accept the perception/cognition distinction as a primitive and inexplicable bright line within the sphere of conscious phenomena.