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2 janvier 2023
- handle: 10670/1.etgbe6
- hal: hal-04105981
- doi: 10.1080/09515089.2022.2161357
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1080/09515089.2022.2161357
Mots-clés
Déjà vu déjà vécu metacognition episodic recollection feeling of familiarity episodic feeling of knowingSujets proches
Haptics Feeling Haptic sense Tactual perception Tactile perceptionCiter ce document
Denis Perrin et al., « Déjà vécu is different from déjà vu: An ability view », HAL-SHS : philosophie, ID : 10.1080/09515089.2022.2161357
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Résumé
This paper tackles the issue of the diversity of déjà experiences. According to the standard view in the neuropsychological literature, they should all be defined by means of a psychological criterion, by which they are experiences triggered by a perceived item and consist of a conscious clash between a first-order feeling of familiarity about the item and a second-order evaluation that assesses the first-order feeling as erroneous. This paper dismisses the standard view and contends there are two types of déjà experiences, labeled déjà vu and déjà vécu respectively. But it also takes issue with the rare proponents of a distinct déjà vécu type. Contrary to their achievement view, it argues that recollection is not involved in déjà vécu experiences as an actual mental state or a component thereof. In our ability view, déjà vécu involves the feeling that one could recollect past occurrences of a currently lived episode of experience.