Fiche du document
2024
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.f1c817...
- hal: hal-04566802
- doi: 10.1093/erae/jbae009
- WOS: 001241855500001
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/erae/jbae009
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Bioeconomic model non-cooperative game mobile public bad spatial exter- nality plum pox virus prevalence subsidy. JEL: Q28 Q57 Q58 Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q2 - Renewable Resources and Conservation/Q.Q2.Q28 - Government Policy Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q57 - Ecological Economics: Ecosystem Services • Biodiversity Conservation • Bioeconomics • Industrial Ecology Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q5 - Environmental Economics/Q.Q5.Q58 - Government PolicySujets proches
AdministrationCiter ce document
César Martínez et al., « The private management of plant disease epidemics: infection levels and social inefficiencies », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1093/erae/jbae009
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
Plant disease control is often implemented at the private property level, and problems of cooperation and coordination between landowners can lead to social inefficiencies. Drawing on the private management problem of sharka on Prunus trees, we analyse an epidemic game and its outcomes according to initial infection levels. We show that, depending on the infection level in each farm, the nature of strategic interactions changes drastically, and a wide range of games can occur, including games with multiple or without pure strategy equilibria and games with coordination or anti-coordination patterns. We characterise the epidemic conditions for which private management produces social inefficiency and analyse the properties of uniform and differentiated subsidy schemes to solve it. We conclude with a discussion of the policy implications of the ongoing deregulation of sharka management in France.
