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- handle: 10670/1.f1fdly
- hal: hal-03475023
- doi: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.01.003
- WOS: 000470669500003
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.01.003
Mots-clés
Intellectual property rights Innovation Imitation Duopoly Developing countries F - International Economics/F.F1 - Trade/F.F1.F12 - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies • Fragmentation F - International Economics/F.F1 - Trade/F.F1.F13 - Trade Policy • International Trade Organizations F - International Economics/F.F1 - Trade/F.F1.F15 - Economic Integration L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O34 - Intellectual Property and Intellectual CapitalSujets proches
Intellectual property--Law and legislation Proprietary rights IP (Intellectual property) Rights, ProprietaryCiter ce document
Emmanuelle Auriol et al., « Universal intellectual property rights: Too much of a good thing? », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2019.01.003
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Résumé
Developing countries' incentives to protect intellectual property rights (IPR) are studied in a model of vertical innovation. Enforcing IPR boosts export opportunities to advanced economies but slows down technological transfers and incentives to invest in R&D. Asymmetric protection of IPR, strict in the North and lax in the South, leads in many cases to a higher world level of innovation than universal enforcement. IPR enforcement is U-shaped in the relative size of the export market compared to the domestic one: rich countries and small/poor countries enforce IPR, the former to protect their innovations, the latter to access foreign markets, while large emerging countries free-ride on rich countries' technology to serve their internal demand.