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2018
- ISIDORE Id: 10670/1.f704b4...
- hal: hal-04056385
- doi: 10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0008
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Methods of analysis Analysis and chemistry Analytical methods Chemical analysis Analysis methods Analysis and examinationCiter ce document
Uriah Kriegel, « Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis? », HAL SHS (Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société), ID : 10.1093/oso/9780198732570.003.0008
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Let propositionalism be the thesis that all mental attitudes are propositional. Antipropositionalists typically point at apparently non-propositional attitudes, such as fearing a dog and loving a spouse, and play defense against attempts at propositional analysis of such attitudes. Here I explore the anti-propositionalist's prospects for going on the offensive, trying to show that some apparently propositional attitudes, notably belief and judgment, can be given non-propositional analysis. Although the notion that belief is a non-propositional attitude may seem ludicrous at first, it is admirably defended by Franz Brentano, whose analysis I propose to expound, update, and deepen here. The basic strategy can be thought of as follows. First, although the grammar of belief-that reports clearly suggests a propositional attitude, the grammar of belief-in reports suggests instead an 'objectual' attitude. Second, with some ingenuity all belief-that reports can be paraphrased into belief-in reports. Third, given certain general considerations, this paraphraseability recommends the view that the psychological reality of belief states is objectual rather than propositional. Nonetheless, I will argue, there are two very real costs associated with this non-propositional analysis of belief.
