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2017
- handle: 10670/1.f7s5p5
- halshs: halshs-01437507
- doi: 10.1007/s40505-017-0118-3
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s40505-017-0118-3
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Incomplete and Discontinuous Preferences rasian Equilibrium Wal Better Reply Security Economies Generalized Games Endogenous Sharing Rules C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C0 - General/C.C0.C02 - Mathematical Methods C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C6 - Mathematical Methods • Programming Models • Mathematical and Simulation Modeling/C.C6.C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium/D.D5.D50 - GeneralSujets proches
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Philippe Bich et al., « Externalities in Economies with Endogenous Sharing Rules », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s40505-017-0118-3
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Résumé
Endogenous sharing rules were introduced by Simon and Zame [16] to model payoff indeterminacy in discontinuous games. They prove the existence in every compact strategic game of a mixed Nash equilibrium and an associated sharing rule. We extend their result to economies with externalities [1] where, by definition, players are restricted to pure strategies. We also provide a new interpretation of payoff indeterminacy in Simon and Zame's model in terms of preference incompleteness.