A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Confidence in Science With An Application to the Public Goods Game
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17 juillet 2022
- handle: 10670/1.fhz9mx
- hal: hal-03725592
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Replication science public goods uncertainty A - General Economics and Teaching/A.A1 - General Economics/A.A1.A11 - Role of Economics • Role of Economists • Market for Economists C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C1 - Econometric and Statistical Methods and Methodology: General/C.C1.C18 - Methodological Issues: General C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism DesignSujets proches
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Luigi Butera et al., « A New Mechanism to Alleviate the Crises of Confidence in Science With An Application to the Public Goods Game », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.fhz9mx
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Résumé
Recently a credibility crisis has taken hold across the social sciences, arguing that a component of Fischer (1935)'s tripod has not been fully embraced: replication. The importance of replications is not debatable scientifically, but researchers and journals' incentives are not sufficient to encourage replications. We analyze a novel, decentralized approach promoting replications through beneficial gains between scholars and editors. We highlight the trade-offs involved in seeking independent replications before submission to journals, and demonstrate the operation of this method via an investigation of the effects of Knightian uncertainty on cooperation in public goods games, a pervasive feature but largely unexplored in the literature.