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- handle: 10670/1.fmtp5z
- hal: hal-03040157
- doi: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103610
- WOS: 000608135400013
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103610
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Mots-clés
Institutional dynamics Petropolitics Lobbying games Stochastic dynamic games Financial liberalization policies D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D72 - Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q3 - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation/Q.Q3.Q32 - Exhaustible Resources and Economic DevelopmentSujets proches
Amusements Children--Recreation Games for children Pastimes Primitive games Recreations Games, Primitive Children's gamesCiter ce document
Raouf Boucekkine et al., « Stochastic petropolitics: The dynamics of institutions in resource-dependent economies », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103610
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Résumé
We investigate the link between resource revenues volatility and institutions. We build a stochastic differential game with two players (conservatives vs. liberals) lobbying for changing the institutions in their preferred directions. First, uncertainty surrounds the dynamics of institutions and the resource revenues. Second, the lobbying power is asymmetric, the conservatives’ power being increasing with resource revenues. We show the existence of a unique equilibrium in the set of affine strategies. We then examine to which extent uncertainty leads to more liberal institutions in the long run, compared to the deterministic case. We finally explore the institutional impact of volatility using a database covering 91 countries over the period 1973–2005. Focusing on financial liberalization, we find that as oil revenue volatility increases, liberalization goes down. This result is robust to different specifications and sample distinctions.