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4 février 2024
- handle: 10670/1.fncl1p
- hal: hal-04437614
- doi: 10.13140/RG.2.2.34507.05921/2
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time temporal becoming absolute becoming presentism growing blockism coordination problem crosstemporal relations necessary connections causation laws of nature dispositions type/token Meinongianism Platonism universals time temporal becoming absolute becoming presentism growing blockism coordination problem crosstemporal relations necessary connections causation laws of nature dispositions type/token Meinongianism Platonism universalsSujets proches
Causality Effect and cause Cause and effect Final causeCiter ce document
Pieter Thyssen, « Cross-Temporal Necessitation? A Platonist Reply to Leininger », HAL-SHS : histoire, philosophie et sociologie des sciences et des techniques, ID : 10.13140/RG.2.2.34507.05921/2
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According to Leininger, presentists and growing blockers cannot explain why past and present regularities persist in the future. In order to do so, they would have to appeal to enforcers, such as causation, laws or dispositions. But in a world with no future, these enforcers are powerless and cannot guarantee future regularity. I disagree and argue that Leininger’s coordination problem can be met by distinguishing type- from token-level necessitation. Whereas token-level necessitation is cross-temporal and subject to Leininger’s coordination problem, type-level necessitation is atemporal and immune to the coordination problem. For this solution to work, though, type-level necessitation must be ontologically prior to token-level necessitation. This forces us to adopt a Platonist position according to which universals are transcendent, and not immanent.