Fiche du document
2024
- handle: 10670/1.fyzkf1
- hal: hal-04465669
- doi: 10.2139/ssrn.3832712
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.2139/ssrn.3832712
Mots-clés
Innovation Digital markets Data privacy Data regulation D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D42 - Monopoly D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design L - Industrial Organization/L.L4 - Antitrust Issues and Policies/L.L4.L42 - Vertical Restraints • Resale Price Maintenance • Quantity DiscountsSujets proches
Public markets Idioms, corrections, errorsCiter ce document
Erik Madsen et al., « Insider Imitation », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.2139/ssrn.3832712
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Résumé
We study how regulating data usage impacts innovation in digital markets. Platforms commonly use proprietary data about third-party sellers to inform their own competing offerings, dampening incentives for innovation. We model this interaction and characterize how data usage restrictions reshape these incentives. An outright ban on data usage may boost or curtail innovation, depending upon the thickness of the right tail of demand for new products. More flexible rules controlling when and what data is made available can always improve the effectiveness of regulation. Our results contribute to an ongoing policy discussion regarding competition in digital markets.