Fiche du document
9 décembre 2022
- handle: 10670/1.g1q8c1
- hal: hal-03892947
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Social norms Field experiment Dynamic models D - Microeconomics/D.D9 - Intertemporal Choice/D.D9.D90 - General C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C93 - Field Experiments C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated GamesSujets proches
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Itzhak Rasooly et al., « Masks, Cameras, and Social Pressure », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.g1q8c1
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Résumé
In contrast to classical social norm experiments, we conduct experiments that semicontinuously randomise the share of individuals who are taking a particular action in a given environment. Using our experimental results, we are able to estimate the distributions of individual tipping points across our settings. We find that tipping points are very heterogenous, and that a substantial share choose to do the action (or not) regardless of what others are doing. We also show that, once embedded in dynamic models, our estimates predict that individuals will end up doing very different things despite engaging in copying-like behaviour.