The effects of inter-municipal cooperation and central grant allocation on the size of the French local public sector
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- handle: 10670/1.g5gpvy
- hal: hal-03901720
- doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102271
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102271
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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Urban politics Cities and towns--Government Municipal reform City government Municipalities Municipal administration Global cities Towns Urban systems Municipalities Urban areasCiter ce document
Touria Jaaidane et al., « The effects of inter-municipal cooperation and central grant allocation on the size of the French local public sector », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102271
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Résumé
The analysis of French municipalities’ public personnel expenditures allows us to study the issue of the size of the local public sector. We concentrate on two paths that French authorities have followed to limit it, i.e., the promotion of inter-municipal cooperation (IMC) and the cut in grants received by municipalities. Our objective is to evaluate their respective role in the evolution of public personnel expenditures at the municipal level, in a context where local politics comes into play. We consider a large panel dataset of municipalities embedded in IMC structures between 2011 and 2018. Our main results, obtained using an original identification strategy, are threefold. We first find evidence that a substitution effect between municipal and IMC personnel expenditures is at work. Second, we find a partisan distorsion through the grant allocation: despite its formula-based definition, aligned and unaligned municipalities are treated differently by the central government. Third, we show that cuts in grants lead to cuts in municipalities’ public wage bills, while partisanship hinders such cuts.