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- handle: 10670/1.gb7bqm
- hal: hal-01377071
- doi: 10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2016.07.003
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2016.07.003
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Mots-clés
Mathematical invariance Metaphor Entropy Information Reduction Complexity Theory of organisms Theoritical biology -bio]/Quantitative Methods [q-bio.QM] -bio]/Biochemistry, Molecular Biology/Biophysics -bio]/Biochemistry, Molecular Biology/Molecular biology -bio]/Biochemistry, Molecular Biology/Structural Biology [q-bio.BM] -bio]/Biodiversity/Populations and Evolution [q-bio.PE] -bio]/Cancer -bio]Sujets proches
Natural science Sciences Science of scienceCiter ce document
Nicole Perret et al., « Reductionist perspectives and the notion of information », HAL-SHS : philosophie, ID : 10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2016.07.003
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Résumé
Reductionism is the dominant stance of biology. According to this perspective, biological phenomena have to fit with physical explanations. Some biologists thought that the introduction of the idea of program was a sound way to overcome both physicalism and reductionism. We argue instead that the introduction of information theory into biology did not liberate biology from reductionism. We argue that the adoption of information in biology is an erroneous transposition from a specific mathematical domain to one where it does not belong. Indeed, the mathematical framework of the information theory is too rigid and discrete to fit with biological phenomena. Therefore, information in biology represents an inappropriate metaphor. Then, we make explicit the use of metaphors and the choice of explanation mode. We argue that the choice of explanation is not neutral. Furthermore, the use of metaphors in science becomes dangerous when they take the place of theories and they lose their paradoxical content.