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2021
- handle: 10670/1.gc0ypj
- halshs: halshs-03282198
- doi: 10.1017/S0266267121000201
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1017/S0266267121000201
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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normative and empirical uncertainty general framework normative uncertainty versus identity uncertainty in Harsanyi and Rawls maximizing expected value ex ante versus ex post perspective D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General/D.D0.D00 - General D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General/D.D0.D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles D - MicroeconomicsSujets proches
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Franz Dietrich et al., « Decision under normative uncertainty », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1017/S0266267121000201
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Résumé
While ordinary decision theory focuses on empirical uncertainty, real decision-makers also face normative uncertainty: uncertainty about value itself. From a purely formal perspective, normative uncertainty is comparable to (Harsanyian or Rawlsian) identity uncertainty in the ‘original position’, where one’s future values are unknown. A comprehensive decision theory must address twofold uncertainty – normative and empirical. We present a simple model of twofold uncertainty, and show that the most popular decision principle – maximizing expected value (‘Expectationalism’) – has different formulations, namely Ex-Ante Expectationalism, Ex-Post Expectationalism, and hybrid theories. These alternative theories recommend different decisions, reasoning modes, and attitudes to risk. But they converge under an interesting (necessary and sufficient) condition.