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7 juillet 2010
- handle: 10670/1.gp4n3a
- hal: hal-00440126
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Vertical foreclosure vertically-related markets telecommunications. telecommunications L - Industrial Organization/L.L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance/L.L1.L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets L - Industrial Organization/L.L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy/L.L5.L51 - Economics of RegulationSujets proches
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Marc Bourreau et al., « Upstream Competition between Vertically Integrated Firms », HAL-SHS : droit et gestion, ID : 10670/1.gp4n3a
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Résumé
We propose a model of two-tier competition between vertically integrated firms and unintegrated downstream firms. We show that, even when integrated firms compete in prices to offer a homogeneous input, the Bertrand result may not obtain, and the input may be priced above marginal cost in equilibrium, which is detrimental to consumers' surplus and social welfare. We obtain that these partial foreclosure equilibria are more likely to exist when downstream competition is fierce. We then use our model to assess the impact of several regulatory tools in the telecommunications industry.