Fiche du document
23 mai 2022
- handle: 10670/1.gzuqww
- hal: hal-03763706
Mots-clés
Eye-tracking Behavioral auditing NudgesSujets proches
Unbelief Scepticism Financial statements--Auditing AuditsCiter ce document
Jean-François Gajewski et al., « Can Nudges Promote Professional Skepticism in Audits? », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.gzuqww
Métriques
Partage / Export
Résumé
The effectiveness of nudges is widely acknowledged in behavioral sciences, though less is known about their usefulness and applicability in accounting or auditing contexts. By contextualizing nudge theory in financial audit settings, this article offers experimental verification of the effects of social norms and justification nudges on audit behavior. Two between-subject experiments (2 social norms x 2 justification) indicate positive effects of nudges on professional skepticism, which provides a marker of audit quality. Then an eye-tracking experiment, conducted during an audit task, helps clarify the cognitive mechanism at play. Specifically, nudged conditions are associated with greater visual attention during assessments of audit evidence. Combined findings thus suggest that nudges are effective at increasing auditors’ visual attention to relevant information, which in turn raises professional skepticism in assessments of audit evidence.