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- handle: 10670/1.h33dds
- hal: hal-03391894
- doi: 10.1257/aer.20171919
- SCIENCESPO: 2441/1gr6n3t28b94tafji6op8tlqs1
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1257/aer.20171919
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/2441/1gr6n3t28b94tafji6op8tlqs1
Mots-clés
informer Payoffs and control rights evaluator D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D83 - Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness I - Health, Education, and Welfare/I.I1 - Health/I.I1.I18 - Government Policy • Regulation • Public Health L - Industrial Organization/L.L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy/L.L5.L51 - Economics of Regulation L - Industrial Organization/L.L6 - Industry Studies: Manufacturing/L.L6.L65 - Chemicals • Rubber • Drugs • Biotechnology O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O3 - Innovation • Research and Development • Technological Change • Intellectual Property Rights/O.O3.O31 - Innovation and Invention: Processes and IncentivesSujets proches
Scientific research Science research Science--Research Service of process Service of papers Abuse of process ProcessCiter ce document
Emeric Henry et al., « Research and the Approval Process: the Organization of Persuasion », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10.1257/aer.20171919
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Résumé
An informer sequentially collects and disseminates information through costly research to persuade an evaluator to approve an activity. Payoffs and control rights are split between informer and evaluator depending on the organizational rules governing the approval process. The welfare benchmark corresponds to Wald’s classic solution for a statistician with payoff equal to the sum of informer and evaluator. Organizations with different commitment power of informer and evaluator are compared from a positive and normative perspective. Granting authority to the informer is socially optimal when information acquisition is sufficiently costly. The analysis is applied to the regulatory process for drug approval.