Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance

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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/hdl/2441/4hgajj9cf48dladkd9pn9jcj4p

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Sciences Po

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http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess



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Capital cities

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Filipe Campante et al., « Capital Cities, Conflict, and Misgovernance », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10670/1.h6svxz


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We investigate the links between capital cities, conflict, and the quality of governance, starting from the assumption that incumbent elites are constrained by the threat of insurrection, and that the latter is rendered less effective by distance from the seat of political power. We show evidence for two key predictions: (i) conflict is more likely to emerge (and dislodge incumbents) closer to the capital, and (ii) isolated capitals are associated with misgovernance. The predictions hold only for relatively nondemocratic countries, and for intrastate conflicts over government (as opposed to territory) – exactly the cases where our central assumption should apply.

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