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- handle: 10670/1.hqrtr0
- halshs: halshs-00943301
- doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011
Mots-clés
Behavioral mechanism design Implementation Lying costs Separable domain C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D0 - General/D.D0.D02 - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D71 - Social Choice • Clubs • Committees • Associations D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism DesignSujets proches
Choice, Social Public choice Collective choice Dishonesty Agency (Philosophy) Agents Person (Philosophy)Citer ce document
Navin Kartik et al., « Simple mechanisms and preferences for honesty », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.011
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Résumé
We consider full implementation in complete-information environments when agents have an arbitrarily small preference for honesty. We offer a condition called separable punishment and show that when it holds and there are at least two agents, any social choice function can be implemented by a simple mechanism in two rounds of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies.