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2013
- handle: 10670/1.ib8sow
- hal: hal-01052683
- doi: 10.5202/rei.v4i1.88
Ce document est lié à :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.5202/rei.v4i1.88
Mots-clés
Bus Cost Regulation Transport D - Microeconomics/D.D2 - Production and Organizations/D.D2.D24 - Production • Cost • Capital • Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity • Capacity L - Industrial Organization/L.L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities/L.L9.L92 - Railroads and Other Surface Transportation L - Industrial Organization/L.L9 - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities/L.L9.L98 - Government PolicySujets proches
Expenses Costs (Economics)Citer ce document
Axel Gautier et al., « Contract Renewal as an Incentive Device: An Application to the French Urban Public Transport Sector », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.5202/rei.v4i1.88
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Résumé
In the French urban public transport industry, operations are often delegated and periodically put out for tender. Thus, operators' incentives to reduce costs come from both profit maximization during the current contract and from the perspective of contract renewal. We construct a dynamic incentive regulation model that captures these features and we show that both the level of cost-reducing effort and its repartition during the contracting period depend on the contract type (cost-plus, gross cost, or net cost contract). We then estimate a cost frontier model for an eight-year panel of French bus companies (664 company-year observations) to test our predictions.