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2022
- handle: 10670/1.imrksb
- hal: hal-03564999
- doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102751
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102751
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Cooperatives Collective commercialization Coordination Cheap talk Field experiments Development C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C9 - Design of Experiments/C.C9.C93 - Field Experiments D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making L - Industrial Organization/L.L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior/L.L2.L26 - Entrepreneurship O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth/O.O1 - Economic Development/O.O1.O12 - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development P - Economic Systems/P.P3 - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions/P.P3.P32 - Collectives • Communes • Agriculture Q - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics • Environmental and Ecological Economics/Q.Q1 - Agriculture/Q.Q1.Q13 - Agricultural Markets and Marketing • Cooperatives • AgribusinessSujets proches
Distribution, Cooperative Cooperative associations Co-operative societies Cooperative distribution Co-ops (Cooperative societies) Stores, Cooperative Cooperatives Cooperative stores Coops (Cooperative societies)Citer ce document
Kodjo Aflagah et al., « Cheap Talk and Coordination in the Lab and in the Field: Collective Commercialization in Senegal », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2021.102751
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Résumé
Most developing-country farms are small and engage in cooperative agriculture. Prior literature has argued that mechanisms aimed at facilitating smallholder coordination such as cooperatives are central to stimulating market participation. At the same time, cooperatives have not always been able to engage in collective action. In this paper, we conduct neutrally framed coordination games and a natural field experiment to test the effect of cheap talk among members of groundnut-producing cooperatives in Senegal. In both experiments, we ask farmers how much they intend to contribute to the group prior to them actually doing so and then, confidentially reveal aggregate intentions to other cooperative members. Based on survey and administrative data, we find that (1) revealing farmers’ intentions improves collective commercialization and this effect increases with group size and (2) learning in the lab transfers to behavior in the day-to-day environment. Implications for policy and future work are discussed.