The Paradox of Unilateralism: Institutionalizing Failure In U.S.-Mexican Drug Strategies

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1 décembre 2013

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Simon Reich et al., « The Paradox of Unilateralism: Institutionalizing Failure In U.S.-Mexican Drug Strategies », Norteamérica, ID : 10670/1.ior2r1


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Realism posits that strong states use compulsory power to influence the behavior of weaker ones. If true, then U.S. policy toward Mexico on a key national security issue such as drugs should illustrate that claim and policy outcomes should reflect U.S. preferences. Yet, in exploring a series of bilateral case studies, this article suggests that unilateral U.S. government initiatives do not achieve their specified goals. Rather, we argue that Mexico effectively employs a series of "strangulation strategies." These derail U.S. initiatives and -under specific conditions- result in institutional agreements that proscribe certain forms of behavior and reduce future U.S. autonomy.

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