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16 janvier 2020
- handle: 10670/1.ipmg7x
- halshs: halshs-02334595
- doi: 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.07.028
- PII: S0377-2217(19)30592-2
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.ejor.2019.07.028
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info:eu-repo/grantAgreement//640772/EU/Distributed Global Financial Systems for Society/DOLFINS
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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Antoine Mandel et al., « Dynamic competition over social networks », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.ejor.2019.07.028
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Résumé
We propose an analytical approach to the problem of influence maximization in a social network where two players compete by means of dynamic targeting strategies. We formulate the problem as a two-player zero-sum stochastic game. We prove the existence of the uniform value: if the players are sufficiently patient, both can guarantee the same mean-average opinion without knowing the exact length of the game. Furthermore, we put forward some elements for the characterization of equilibrium strategies. In general, players must implement a trade-off between a forward-looking perspective, according to which they aim to maximize the future spread of their opinion in the network, and a backward-looking perspective, according to which they aim to counteract their opponent’s previous actions. When the influence potential of players is small, we describe an equilibrium through a one-shot game based on eigenvector centrality.