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- handle: 10670/1.jcu37v
- hal: hal-02351433
- doi: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.10.001
- PII: S0165-4896(19)30077-0
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.10.001
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
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Sebastien Courtin et al., « Multi-dimensional rules », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.10.001
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Highlights The decision structures aggregate the opinions of voters on several dimensions. Characterization of weighted multi-dimensional rules is provided. Some multi-dimensional rules are represented by a combination of single dimension rules. Links to the referendum paradox and the Ostrogorski paradox are made.AbstractThis paper deals with rules that specify the collective acceptance or rejection of a proposal with several dimensions. We introduce the notions of separability and weightedness in this context. We provide a partial characterization of separable rules and show the independence between separability and weightedness.