Multi-dimensional rules

Metadatas

type
Language
Identifiers
Relations

This document is linked to :
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.10.001

Collection

Archives ouvertes

Licenses

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess


Abstract En

Highlights The decision structures aggregate the opinions of voters on several dimensions. Characterization of weighted multi-dimensional rules is provided. Some multi-dimensional rules are represented by a combination of single dimension rules. Links to the referendum paradox and the Ostrogorski paradox are made.AbstractThis paper deals with rules that specify the collective acceptance or rejection of a proposal with several dimensions. We introduce the notions of separability and weightedness in this context. We provide a partial characterization of separable rules and show the independence between separability and weightedness.

document thumbnail

From the same authors

On the same subjects

Within the same disciplines

Export in