On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship

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Date

7 mai 2013

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Type de document
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Source

HALSHS : archive ouverte en Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société

Collection

Archives ouvertes

Organisation

Centre pour la communication scientifique directe

Licence

info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess

Mots-clés En Und

incomplete contracts relationship-specific investments cooperation K - Law and Economics/K.K1 - Basic Areas of Law/K.K1.K12 - Contract Law L - Industrial Organization/L.L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior/L.L2.L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

Sujets proches En

Distribution, Cooperative Cooperative distribution Cooperative movement

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José de Sousa et al., « On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer-supplier relationship », HALSHS : archive ouverte en Sciences de l’Homme et de la Société, ID : 10670/1.jjj45b

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Does formal contracting foster cooperation in a buyer-supplier relationship? In line with the literature, we find that a renegotiable contract with relationshipspecific joint investments does not make it possible to reach the first-best. However, we show that a renegotiable contract may induce more cooperation than an informal arrangement can. This result may help to understand how cooperation emerges in Japanese procurement practices, which typically involve relationshipspecific joint investments and renegotiable contracts.

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