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- handle: 10670/1.jk06zy
- hal: hal-03796415
- doi: 10.1111/iere.12570
- WOS: 000768167600001
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1111/iere.12570
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Insurance Markets Regulation Multiple Contracting Adverse Selection. Insurance Markets Regulation Multiple Contracting Adverse Selection. JEL Classification: D43 D82 D86 Adverse Selection. JEL Classification: D43 D82 D86 Insurance MarketsSujets proches
Public markets Assurance (Insurance) Coverage, Insurance Insurance protection Insurance coverage Insurance industry Indemnity insurance Mutual insurance UnderwritingCiter ce document
Andrea Attar et al., « Regulating Insurance Markets: Multiple Contracting and Adverse Selection », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1111/iere.12570
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Résumé
We study insurance markets in which privately informed consumers can purchase coverage from several firms whose pricing strategies are subject to an anti-dumping regulation. The resulting regulated game supports a single allocation in which each layer of coverage is fairly priced given the consumer types who purchase it. This competitive allocation cannot be Pareto-improved by a social planner who can neither observe consumer types nor monitor their trades with firms. Accordingly, we argue that public intervention under multiple contracting and adverse selection should penalize firms that cross-subsidize between contracts, while leaving consumers free to choose their preferred amount of coverage.