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16 octobre 2014
- handle: 10670/1.jnigcu
- halshs: halshs-01074956
info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Deposit Insurance Bank Risk-Taking Leverage Systemic Bank Capital Buffer Market Discipline Too Big to Fail G - Financial Economics/G.G1 - General Financial Markets/G.G1.G18 - Government Policy and Regulation G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G21 - Banks • Depository Institutions • Micro Finance Institutions • Mortgages G - Financial Economics/G.G2 - Financial Institutions and Services/G.G2.G28 - Government Policy and Regulation G - Financial Economics/G.G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance/G.G3.G32 - Financing Policy • Financial Risk and Risk Management • Capital and Ownership Structure • Value of Firms • GoodwillSujets proches
Banks and banking--Government guaranty of deposits Bank deposit insurance Insurance, Deposit Savings insuranceCiter ce document
Mathias Lé, « Heterogeneous Adjustments in Bank Leverage after Deposit Insurance Adoption », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10670/1.jnigcu
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Résumé
This paper empirically investigates the bank leverage adjustments after deposit insurance adoption. Banks are found to increase significantly their leverage after the introduction of deposit insurance. However, the banks’ responses appear to be heterogenous.The magnitude of the change in bank leverage decreases with (i) the size, (ii) the systemicity and (iii) the initial capitalisation of banks so that the most systemic and the most highly leveraged banks are unresponsive to deposit insurance. As a result, implementing a deposit insurance scheme could have important competitive effects.