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- handle: 10670/1.joy53u
- hal: hal-04023835
- doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.011
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.011
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Mots-clés
Multidimensional Screening Externality Ironing Network Goods Influence D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D42 - Monopoly D - Microeconomics/D.D6 - Welfare Economics/D.D6.D62 - Externalities D - Microeconomics/D.D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty/D.D8.D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism DesignSujets proches
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Franz Ostrizek et al., « Screening while Controlling an Externality », Archive ouverte de Sciences Po (SPIRE), ID : 10.1016/j.geb.2023.01.011
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Résumé
We propose a tractable framework to introduce externalities in a screening model. Agents differ in both payoff-type and influence-type (ranking how beneficial their actions are for others). Applications range from pricing network goods to regulating industries that create externalities. Inefficiencies arise only if the payoff-type is unobservable. When both dimensions are unobserved, the optimal allocation satisfies lexicographic monotonicity: increasing along the payoff-type to satisfy incentive compatibility, but tilted towards influential agents to move the externality in the socially desirable direction. In particular, the allocation depends on a private characteristic that is payoff-irrelevant for the agent. We characterize the solution through a two-step ironing procedure that addresses the nonmonotonicity in virtual values arising from the countervailing impact of payoffand influence-type. Rents from influence can emerge but only indirectly, i.e. when the observed level of influence is used as a signal of the unobserved payoff-type.