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- handle: 10670/1.k1vn1h
- hal: hal-03049103
- doi: 10.1093/jeea/jvz015
- WOS: 000562429000005
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1093/jeea/jvz015
Mots-clés
C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory/C.C7.C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics/D.D4 - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design/D.D4.D44 - Auctions L - Industrial Organization/L.L5 - Regulation and Industrial Policy/L.L5.L51 - Economics of RegulationSujets proches
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Nozomu Muto et al., « Revenue-capped efficient auctions », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1093/jeea/jvz015
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Résumé
We study an auction that maximizes the expected social surplus under an upper-bound constraint on the seller’s expected revenue, which we call a revenue cap. Such a constrained-efficient auction may arise, for example, when (i) the auction designer is “pro-buyer”, that is, he maximizes the weighted sum of the buyers’ and seller’s auction payoffs, where the weight for the buyers is greater than that for the seller; (ii) the auction designer maximizes the (unweighted) total surplus in a multiunit auction in which the number of units the seller owns is private information; or (iii) multiple sellers compete to attract buyers before the auction. We characterize the mechanisms for constrained-efficient auctions and identify their important properties. First, the seller sets no reserve price and sells the good for sure. Second, with a nontrivial revenue cap, “bunching” is necessary. Finally, with a sufficiently severe revenue cap, the constrained-efficient auction has a bid cap, so that bunching occurs at least “at the top,” that is, “no distortion at the top” fails.