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2014
- handle: 10670/1.k8ryjf
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strategic candidacy strong candidate stability experimental method frequencies parliamentary voting rules pluralitySujets proches
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Abdoul Aziz Ndiaye, « Une étude expérimentale de la forte stabilité », Recherches économiques de Louvain, ID : 10670/1.k8ryjf
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An Experimental Study of Strong Candidate Stability In this paper, we study the strong candidate stability of a voting procedure as defined by Dutta et al. [2001] through the experimental method. In this sense, a voting rule is said to be strongly candidate stable if the winner of the election remains unchanged after an attempted manipulation by strategic candidacy of a potential candidate. In an election with three candidates and a small electorate, we evaluate experimentally frequencies of the strong candidate stability of parliamentary voting rules and plurality. JEL Classification: D71.