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- handle: 10670/1.kaodci
- hal: hal-02110601
- doi: 10.1016/j.irle.2018.12.010
- PII: S0144-8188(18)30340-5
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.irle.2018.12.010
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/ , info:eu-repo/semantics/OpenAccess
Mots-clés
Social norms Peer punishment Saving face CooperationSujets proches
Penology Penalties (Criminal law) Distribution, Cooperative Cooperative distribution Cooperative movementCiter ce document
Katherine Farrow et al., « The stickiness of norms », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1016/j.irle.2018.12.010
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Résumé
In this paper we study the role of social context, as characterized by different informal norm-enforcement mechanisms, on the deterrence legacy of temporary external regulations. In a public goods game, we create conditions in which a prosocial norm of cooperation is enforced via either anonymous peer punishment or face-saving concerns. In two test treatments, we introduce to these social environments an external regulation that is implemented for a limited period of time and then removed. We observe a significant negative post-intervention effect of this removal in the context of peer disapproval, but no such effect in the context of face-saving concerns. Our findings reveal the importance of the type of norm-enforcement mechanism in determining the robustness of norm adherence in the long term.