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- handle: 10670/1.kck73v
- halshs: halshs-01354603
- doi: 10.1007/s11127-016-0331-x
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info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11127-016-0331-x
Mots-clés
political fragmentation political coalitions political competition C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods/C.C3 - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models • Multiple Variables/C.C3.C35 - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models • Discrete Regressors • Proportions D - Microeconomics/D.D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making/D.D7.D70 - General H - Public Economics/H.H4 - Publicly Provided Goods/H.H4.H40 - General H - Public Economics/H.H7 - State and Local Government • Intergovernmental Relations/H.H7.H72 - State and Local Budget and ExpendituresSujets proches
Coalition (Social sciences)Citer ce document
Benoît Le Maux et al., « Competition in fragmentation among political coalitions: theory and evidence », HAL-SHS : économie et finance, ID : 10.1007/s11127-016-0331-x
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Résumé
This article proposes a game-theoretic setting to explain the fragmentation of majority and opposition coalitions in governments. The model is two-stage: (1) the leaders of each coalition control the size of the parties in their group so as to maximize the political power of their coalition, and (2) the political party leaders in each coalition decide their degree of participation in their coalition’s collective action. The main conclusion is that the concentration in the two opposing coalitions will be related when the competition between them is fierce. This is shown to hold for the Left-wing and Right-wing coalitions in French local governments, revealing competition in fragmentation in these coalitions.